Point 11 of the U.S.–Iran MOU: Does It Reach Private Terrorism Judgments, or Only OFAC-Blocked Assets?

Analysis by Herischi Law

On June 17, 2026, a senior U.S. official released the full text of the 14-point Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Most of the public attention has gone to the ceasefire, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and the nuclear provisions. For the families and businesses holding judgments against Iran under the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, however, the operative language is Point 11 — and what it does not say is as important as what it does.

This post examines a narrow but consequential question: does Point 11 purport to reach assets that private litigants have pursued through the courts, or does it operate only on the administrative category of “blocked” assets controlled by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)? We then turn to the practical consequences for enforcement under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), and to the threshold constitutional question of whether an MOU can do anything at all to statutes like 28 U.S.C. § 1605A and TRIA § 201.

What Point 11 Actually Says

In substance, Point 11 commits the United States to make all frozen or restricted Iranian funds and assets fully available, with the procedures for their release and use to be agreed during the negotiation of a final deal. It further provides that those funds may be directed to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of Iran, with the United States issuing the licenses necessary to accomplish that. Reporting on the text places the universe of potentially affected assets at as much as roughly $100 billion, though the relief is sequenced and conditioned on Iranian performance rather than being immediate.

Three features of the text are critical for our analysis. First, it speaks the vocabulary of the sanctions regime — “frozen or restricted,” “licenses” — not the vocabulary of the courts. Second, it identifies the Central Bank of Iran as the entity that designates beneficiaries. Third, it contains no reference whatsoever to judgments, judgment creditors, liens, writs of attachment, victims, or the FSIA. That silence frames everything that follows.

The Core Question: A Sanctions Instrument, Not a Judicial One

Our view is that Point 11, read on its own terms, addresses the OFAC-blocked category of assets and the executive branch’s own licensing authority over that category. It is an executive-to-executive political commitment about what the United States will do with property it has administratively immobilized under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Executive Order 13599. It is not, and on its face does not pretend to be, an adjudication of any private party’s property rights.

That distinction matters because TRIA enforcement and OFAC blocking, while overlapping, are different legal layers:

• The administrative layer (OFAC). Under IEEPA and EO 13599, the President blocked Iranian government and Central Bank assets within U.S. jurisdiction. The President can also unblock them, by license or by amending the order. This is the layer Point 11 speaks to.

• The judicial-enforcement layer (private litigation). Under TRIA § 201(a), once a claimant holds a judgment against a “terrorist party” on a terrorism claim, the blocked assets of that party (including its agencies and instrumentalities) become subject to execution and attachment to satisfy compensatory damages. The 2008 addition of 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) broadened the reach to “property of” the state and its instrumentalities, setting aside the separate-juridical-status defense of First National City Bank v. Bancec.

The friction point is that TRIA’s predicate is the word “blocked.” Section 201(a) reaches blocked assets. If the executive removes the block, it arguably removes the statutory hook on which a future TRIA attachment depends. That is the mechanism by which a sanctions instrument like Point 11 can quietly reshape private enforcement without ever mentioning a courtroom.

We think the correct analysis therefore turns on the posture of any given asset, and divides into three categories.

1. Blocked, but not yet attached. Where no creditor has obtained a writ or perfected a lien, executive unblocking under Point 11 can prospectively withdraw the asset from the TRIA-eligible pool and route it to a Central-Bank-designated beneficiary. IEEPA’s licensing authority is broad, and courts have long deferred to it. For this category, Point 11 can be effective — and devastating to creditors who have not yet moved.

2. Already subject to a perfected writ, lien, or turnover order. Here the analysis is very different, and the executive’s own historical practice proves the point. When President Bush vested Iraq’s blocked assets in 2003 for post-war reconstruction, the confiscation order expressly excluded both diplomatic property and assets that had already been ordered attached in satisfaction of FSIA and TRIA § 201 judgments before the order’s date. The executive recognized then what we would argue now: a perfected judicial attachment is a vested property interest that an unblocking decision does not simply erase. An MOU, which is a weaker instrument than an executive confiscation order, cannot do more.

3. Unblocked but still “property of” Iran. Because § 1610(g) is not tied to blocked status in the same way TRIA § 201 is, some routes to execution may survive unblocking — subject to § 1610(g)’s own ownership and nexus requirements, and subject to the limits the D.C. Circuit recognized in Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran (2023), where the court held that TRIA’s “notwithstanding” clause is too indirect to abrogate the United States’ own sovereign immunity over assets it holds.

The short answer to the question posed in the title: Point 11 is aimed at the OFAC-blocked category, not at private litigation directly — but because TRIA borrows the “blocked” predicate, the line between the two is thinner than the text suggests, and only already-perfected creditor interests stand on firm ground.

The Effect on TRIA Enforcement

If the $100 billion (or the smaller tranches that have been reported in various drafts) is unblocked and remitted to Central-Bank-designated beneficiaries, the practical effect on TRIA enforcement is severe for the largest segment of claimants. TRIA is, at bottom, a mechanism for reaching a res. Remove the res from U.S. jurisdiction — or remove its “blocked” status — and the mechanism has nothing to grip. The Congressional Research Service has estimated tens of billions of dollars in unsatisfied terrorism judgments against Iran; the holders of those judgments who have not yet identified and attached specific assets would lose their most realistic target.

The marquee, already-litigated assets are a different story. The roughly $1.75–2 billion in Bank Markazi holdings adjudicated through Bank Markazi v. Peterson — the Beirut Marine barracks litigation — were reduced to final orders and are far more defensible against any release. Likewise, any creditor who has perfected an attachment can invoke the 2003 Iraq carve-out logic and the Takings and Due Process Clauses. The dividing line, again, is perfection: enforcement that has crossed into a vested judicial interest is protected; enforcement that remains a prospective hope against the general blocked pool is exposed.

One narrow lever does not help the executive clear the path. TRIA § 201(b) gives the President an asset-by-asset, national-security waiver of the attachment requirement — but only for property subject to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations. It cannot be used to release ordinary blocked Central Bank deposits or commercial accounts. As Iran itself acknowledged in its ICJ filings, there is no relevant § 201(b) waiver for the Bank Markazi funds. The executive’s clean tool, in other words, reaches embassies, not bank balances.

Can an MOU “Change” § 1605A or TRIA?

No. This is the firmest conclusion in the entire analysis, and it is worth stating plainly for clients who fear that a diplomatic signature has rewritten their statutory rights.

An MOU is not a treaty. It has not been submitted to the Senate for advice and consent, and on the public reporting it functions at most as a political commitment or a sole executive agreement. Under INS v. Chadha, federal law is made and unmade only through bicameralism and presentment. An executive agreement cannot amend or repeal a statute, and Medellín v. Texas confirms that even a binding international obligation does not become domestic law the President can wield to displace existing law. A non-binding 14-point understanding is several steps weaker still. Section 1605A and TRIA § 201 remain fully in force the day after the MOU is signed.

What the executive can do is exercise the powers Congress has already delegated. That is principally the IEEPA licensing and unblocking authority, and Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981) is the high-water mark — there the Supreme Court upheld the nullification of attachments against Iran pursuant to the Algiers Accords. But Dames & Moore rested on three pillars that Point 11 may not be able to reproduce: a long history of congressional acquiescence in claims settlement, an express IEEPA footing, and — most importantly — an alternative remedy, the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, that left claimants with somewhere to go. Extinguishing final § 1605A judgments and leaving the holders with nothing is a materially different proposition, and one that implicates Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm‘s prohibition on undoing final judgments and the Fifth Amendment’s just-compensation requirement.

Measured against the Youngstown framework, an executive attempt to release assets in a manner that contradicts the creditor-protection scheme Congress built into TRIA and § 1610(g) would sit at the lowest ebb of presidential power — acting against the implied will of Congress. Bank Markazi v. Peterson shows that it took an act of Congress (the statute at 22 U.S.C. § 8772) to definitively direct specific assets to specific judgments; the mirror image — definitively clearing those assets away from creditors — would realistically require Congress too.

The lawful path, if Washington wants peace without stranding victims, is the one the system already contemplates: compensate the judgment holders directly, through the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund or a Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act–style buyout, and take the assets by subrogation. That is the structure that made Dames & Moore constitutionally tolerable, and its absence from the MOU is conspicuous.

What Judgment Holders Should Do Now

The MOU’s text does not extinguish anyone’s rights, but its implementation could erode the practical value of those rights asset by asset. The operative documents will not be the MOU; they will be the Treasury licenses issued under Point 11 and the dockets in which creditors have — or have not — perfected their interests. Clients holding § 1605A judgments should be moving now to identify and attach specific blocked assets before any unblocking license issues, to perfect existing writs, and to prepare to challenge any release that would defeat a vested interest. The 2015 playbook, when terrorism victims sued in the Southern District of New York to enjoin release of frozen Iranian funds, is the template — and the window to act is the negotiation period the MOU itself builds in.

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This article is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice or create an attorney–client relationship. The U.S.–Iran MOU is a recently released framework whose implementing terms remain to be negotiated; the analysis above is based on the public text and on existing law, both of which may change. Holders of judgments against Iran should consult counsel about their specific circumstances. Herischi Law represents victims of state-sponsored terrorism and parties in FSIA and international-law matters.